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Corporate boards, shareholding structures and voluntary disclosure in emerging 
MENA economies   
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper investigates the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, 
corporate governance best practices, and the extent to which board characteristics and 
shareholding structures can explain discernible differences in the level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure in a number of emerging Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
economies.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper uses a number of multivariate regression methods, 
namely ordinary least squares, weighted, non-linear, lagged-effects, two stage least squares and 
fixed-effects regression techniques to analyse data collected for a sample of listed corporations 
in emerging MENA economies from 2009 to 2014.  
 
Findings: First, in general, MENA listed firms have a relatively lower level of voluntary 
compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance practices compared to listed firms in 
developed countries. Second, our evidence suggests that corporate board characterist ics, 
including board diversity have a positive association with the level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. In contrast, the findings indicate that unitary board leadership structure, 
director shareholdings, and government shareholdings impact negatively on the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. The study does not, however, find any evidence to 
suggest that family shareholdings have any significant relationship with the level of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. The findings are generally robust to alternative measures and 
potential endogeneity problems.  
 
Originality/value: This is one of the first empirical efforts at investigating the association 
between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure in emerging MENA 
economies that observably relies on a multi-theoretical framework within a longitudinal cross-
country research setting. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; voluntary disclosure; board characteristics ; 
shareholding structures; emerging MENA economies. 
  
Article classification: Research paper 
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1. Introduction  
Prominent corporate scandals in the 1990s/2000s followed by the 2007/08 global financial crisis have 
increased global interest in pursuing good corporate governance (CG) reforms often aimed at enhancing 
greater corporate accountability, social responsibility, transparency, and disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013; 
Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016, Soobaroyen et al., 2017; Pillai et al., 2018). This paper, 
therefore, examines the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in emerging MENA 
economies, and the extent to which corporate board characteristics and shareholding structures can 
explain discernible variations in the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The 
analysis and interpretations of the findings draw inspiration from a multi-theoretical framework that 
draw insights from a number of CG and disclosure theories.       
Whilst the push for improvement in the level of CG, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency has mainly been concentrated in developed countries for decades, such as UK and US, 
recent years have also witnessed emerging economies showing an increasing interest in promoting the 
level of firm compliance with, and disclosure of, best CG practices through the adoption of CG codes 
(Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Soobaroyen et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). MENA 
countries are also among a large group of emerging economies pursuing such CG reforms, which are 
primarily motivated by the ability of such CG codes to address systemic issues of corporate 
accountability, responsibility, and transparency (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Soobaroyen et al., 2017). Implementation of such CG codes may also help reduce corporate financial 
risk and thereby improve corporate performance in these countries (Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 
2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Ebaid, 2013; Aljifri et al., 
2014; Albitar, 2015). In general, recent adoption of CG codes in emerging MENA economies tends to 
seek to complement other economic and financial reforms that they have often pursued and are aimed 
at encouraging domestic savings, as well as attracting foreign direct investments (Lagoarde-Segot and 
Lucey, 2008; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017; Hessayri and Saihi, 
2018).  
Meanwhile, theoretically, publicly listed corporations and their managers in emerging 
economies may commit to comprehensive compliance with, and disclosure of, best CG best practices 
for a number of reasons. First, increased commitment to transparency and accountability through 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices can minimise agency problems (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) by reducing information asymmetry 
between managers and corporate stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008), which may enhance firm performance. Second, from legitimacy theory perspective (Aguilera et 
al., 2007; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), engaging in greater transparency and disclosure practices through 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices can strategically enhance congruence of corporate 
goals and norms with those of society, which can facilitate sustainable corporate operations by 
improving corporate reputation and goodwill (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Md Zaini et al., 2018). 
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Third, from a resource-dependence perspective, increased engagement with voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure practices may help in facilitating access to essential resources, such as subsidies, tax 
exemptions, contracts, and finance, through minimising capital and political costs as a result of 
improved corporate image and reputation (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), 
that can also improve company performance. Finally, stakeholder theory argues that committing to 
more voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices can be an effective strategy to gain the support 
of influential corporate stakeholders, such as regulators, investors, government, and employees who 
may be important to a corporation's ability to conduct economically viable operations (Dalton et al., 
1998; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). To sum up, 
greater commitment to voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices could have significant 
implications not only for its ability to improve corporate accountability, social responsibility, and 
transparency, but also corporate finance in the form of enhancing their investment, financing and 
liquidity opportunities (Ntim et al., 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et 
al., 2018). 
 Whilst a number of prior studies have focused on the drivers of, and reasons for, the extent of 
CG compliance and disclosure practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-
Bassam et al., 2018), they seem to suffer from a number of limitations. First, although disclosure 
decisions are perceived to be mainly influenced by top management and shareholding structure 
mechanisms (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005), existing CG disclosure studies have investigated 
whether CG disclosure practices are largely driven by general company features, such as firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, and gearing (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Kamel and 
Awadallah, 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). Second, existing voluntary disclosure studies have mainly 
employed a short period/one year cross-sectional data (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha et al., 
2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Ahmed et al., 2017; Kamel and 
Awadallah, 2017; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017), and thereby limiting our understanding of voluntary 
CG compliance and disclosure behaviour over-time. Third, although the limited ability of any single 
theory to fully explain the various reasons and motivations underlying corporate voluntary disclosure 
behaviour has become evident in a steady, but gradually increasing theoretical and empirical evidence 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Al-Bassam et al., 2018), existing studies on voluntary CG disclosure have 
largely relied on single theoretical perspectives (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2012; Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), or are mainly descriptive in nature 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Piesse et al., 2012), and thereby impairing the development of new theoretical insights, 
advancement, and understanding. Finally and as previously noted, emerging markets have shown 
observable interest in developing CG practices by the considerable number of reforms that have been 
introduced over the last decade (Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan, 2010; Ebaid, 2013, Habash et al., 2015; 
Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Soobaroyen et al., 2017). However and by contrast, there is acute scarcity 
of studies that investigate CG practices in emerging economies, especially within a cross-country 
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research setting (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; 
Md Zaini et al., 2018). Arguably, this impairs current understanding of the motivations for, and 
determinants of, corporate voluntary CG disclosures, especially in emerging economies. 
Therefore, the current study seeks to extend existing knowledge by offering a number of new 
contributions to the literature. First, we provide new evidence on the level of voluntary compliance 
with, and disclosure of, best CG practices among publicly listed MENA firms following the pursuance 
of CG reforms. Thus, the study contributes to the literature by offering evidence on the extent to which 
the existing MENA countries’ national CG codes have helped in improving CG standards in listed 
corporations of these countries. 
Second, we add to the existing literature by examining whether board characteristics and 
shareholding structures can explain observable changes in voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
practices. This differs from a number of past studies that have mainly investigated how general company 
features, such as firm size, profitability, liquidity, and gearing affect voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. Our argument is that in a competitive and informationally asymmetric market, 
whereby voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices have significant financial and non-financial 
cost implications, better-governed corporations need to distinguish themselves by credibly signalling 
their good governance, accountability and transparency qualities by committing to increased voluntary 
CG compliance and disclosure practices (Ntim et al., 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 
2018). Arguably, this can help in improving current understanding of the main factors that drive the 
level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices in emerging MENA economies in 
where various stakeholders, such as the national governments and stock exchanges often have keen 
interest in CG and stakeholder issues. Third, we use data collected over a relatively long and recent 
period (i.e., from 2009 to 2014) and thus allows us to distinctively shed crucial and timely empirical 
insights on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices over a relatively long period of time. 
Finally and given the different motivations for voluntary CG compliance and disclosure (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Al-Bassam et al., 2018), the study is distinguished from previous studies by its explicit 
examination of a number of theoretical perspectives, including agency, legitimacy, resource 
dependence, and stakeholder theories, as providing the likely basis for understanding and explaining 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in the particular context of emerging MENA 
economies.  
  The decision to focus on MENA emerging economies is motivated by a number of reasons. 
First, and consistent with global developments, MENA emerging economies have pursued CG reforms 
by issuing national CG codes [1]. Similar to most emerging economies, MENA CG codes adopts a UK-
style voluntary “comply or explain” compliance and disclosure regime (Piesse et al., 2012; Elghuweel 
et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Pillai et al., 2018). However and distinct from most developed 
countries, MENA context has distinctive cultural features of having strong hierarchical social structure, 
where greater importance is usually attached to informal relationships, such as family loyalty, norms, 
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and tribalism than formal CG and accountability mechanisms like corporate boards (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Md Zaini et al., 2018). The MENA corporate setting is further 
characterised by concentrated shareholding structures, especially by government and families, and low 
levels of institutional shareholdings, resulting in weak ability of shareholders to enforce managerial 
accountability, responsibility and control (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et 
al., 2016; Md Zaini et al., 2018). Arguably, these contextual challenges raise serious empirical questions 
as to whether voluntary compliance and disclosure CG codes that are prevalent in MENA economies  
can improve CG standards in their listed corporations (Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). 
This study, thus, seeks to contribute to the existing literature by investigating the motivations for, and 
determinants of, voluntary CG disclosures in MENA emerging economies.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses the CG 
environment in MENA economies. The following sections present the theoretical framework, review 
the literature and develop hypotheses, discuss the research design, and present the empirical and 
robustness analyses, whilst the final section offers concluding remarks.       
                                  
2. The governance environment in MENA emerging economies    
MENA economies provide a suitable context to conduct the current study for a number of reasons. First, 
most MENA economies have many cultural, social and economic features in common, along with other 
characteristics of developing countries. Specifically, the people speak Arabic as a common language, 
follow a common Islamic religion, and share many customs and traditions, which may arguably have 
an effect on economic features, business practices, shareholding structures, and the information 
environment, especially voluntary disclosure environment (Al-Shamri and Al-Sultan, 2010; Albitar, 
2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Habbash et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Md 
Zaini et al., 2018; Pillai et al., 2018). In this regard, MENA countries’ corporate practices are expected 
to be affected by both formal and informal rules (Moideenkutty et al., 2011; Elghuweel et al., 2017). 
Specifically, managers can be expected to be influenced more by informal rules (e.g., family, norms, 
Arabic customs and tribalism) and thus they are likely to give such informal rules higher priority than 
formal rules and governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Al-
Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Pillai et al., 2018). However, 
commitment to such traditional norms may arguably have a negative effect on MENA directors’ ability 
to independently monitor managers and ultimately enhance voluntary disclosure of CG practices. 
Second, most companies in MENA countries are either state owned or family held firms with 
concentrated shareholding structures. As such, they differ from companies in developed countries, 
which by contrast, tend to depend extensively on external finance from stock markets (Omran et al., 
2008; Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 
2017; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017). Third, the legal system and corporate laws tend to provide limited 
protection to minority shareholders compared with those operating in developed economies (Omran et 
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al., 2008). Additionally, accounting standards are often developed and implemented by central 
government, with little involvement of national professional accounting bodies, which are often poorly 
organised and/or even non-existent (Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan 2010; Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 
2010; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015).  
Fourth, the financial systems in most MENA countries are bank-orientated (Ebaid, 2013), and 
therefore capital markets are not vibrant, and enforcement of capital markets rules are weak (Elghuweel 
et al., 2017). This helps in explaining why most listed companies in these economies do not often adhere 
to the disclosure and transparency requirements that have been imposed by stock market authorities 
(Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Md 
Zaini et al., 2018). Consequently, minority shareholders’ rights are limited because of the inefficiency 
in the information environment that encourages insiders and majority shareholders to gain from private 
information (Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 2010; Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Hassoun 
and Aloui, 2017).  
Despite differences among MENA countries, almost all need to develop their investment 
environment, especially their stock markets and related governance mechanisms. Sound governance 
practices can help firms to gain access to finance, lower the cost of capital, achieve better performance, 
and provide fairer treatment of all stockholders (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014). 
Similarly, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries depend extensively on extracting and exporting 
oil and have recently discovered the need for diversifying their finance and investment by developing 
their financial markets, especially given the volatility of oil prices of the early 1980s, late 1990s, and 
more recently in the 2010s (Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et 
al., 2017; Pillai et al., 2018). For other MENA countries, active capital markets are considered essential 
for the pursuance of successful economic and financial reforms, which began in the early 1990s. These 
reforms depend on large-scale privatisation programmes involving the divestiture of large public sector 
companies (Piesse et al., 2012; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017). Consequently, most MENA countries have 
thus engaged in economic and financial reforms (such as developing national stock exchanges, issuing 
national governance codes, and improving business-related laws and regulations) with the aim of 
encouraging domestic savings and attracting foreign investments (Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan 2010; 
Ebaid, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Elkelish, 
2017; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Hessayri and Saihi, 2018). Indeed, the 
empirical evidence supports the role of good governance practices in enhancing market efficiency and 
the information environment of the MENA countries (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Samaha et al., 
2012; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Al-Basaam et al., 2018). 
However, other empirical evidence documents that their incentives for frequent disclosure and 
transparency are lower than their counterparts in developed countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Al-Shammair and 
Al-Sultan, 2010; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Md Zaini et al., 2018), due to the absence of 
standards set out by authoritative accounting and reporting bodies that can mandate public firms to 
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improve their disclosure practices (Alsaeed, 2006; Aljifri, et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Md Zaini et al., 
2018). Thus, the current study seeks to examine the extent to which MENA corporations voluntarily 
comply with and disclose their good governance practice recommendations contained in their CG codes.  
 
3. Governance and voluntary disclosure: Literature review and hypotheses development 
A large number of scholars have investigated the motives and antecedents of voluntary disclosure of 
good CG practices (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; 
Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). The current study seeks to extend 
that voluntary disclosure literature. In particular, it draws on agency, legitimacy, resource dependence, 
and stakeholder theories to investigate the association between board characteristics, shareholding 
structures, and the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in MENA listed firms. 
 
3.1 Board diversity and voluntary disclosure 
Corporate boards are required to fulfil certain roles, including advising managers, monitoring 
executives and securing resources (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Board diversity can enhance board 
effectiveness by improving their ability to fulfil their assigned roles. From the agency theory 
perspective, recruiting directors with a broader range of attributes can enhance board efficiency by 
increasing board independence, improving managerial monitoring and performance, and bringing 
diverse ideas and opinions to board discussions (Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Anifowose et al., 2017). 
Additionally, more heterogonous boards can have access to external organisations through different 
channels of communication provided by the different directors (resource dependence theory). Likewise, 
diversified boards can enhance network ties that may provide access to resources, such as finance from 
external organisations (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Similarly, and from the stakeholder and 
legitimation theoretical perspectives, more diverse boards provide better links between the company 
and its external environment and influential stakeholders (stakeholder theory) (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013), by enhancing company legitimacy and the board’s trustworthiness (legitimacy theory) (Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Anifowose et al., 2017).  
 A large number of empirical studies have supported the positive impact of diverse boards on 
voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cook, 2002, 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi 
et al., 2016), although there are few of such studies with regard to MENA countries. In Jordan, Ibrahim 
and Hanefah (2014) document that board diversity (independence, gender, age, and nationality) has a 
positive impact on the level of CSR disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, our first hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H1. There is a positive association between board diversity on the basis of gender and ethnic 
minority and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.   
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3.2 Board leadership structure and voluntary disclosure 
The board chairperson is responsible for running board meetings, in addition to supervising, hiring, 
firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Thus, agency theory suggests that 
concentrating the board leadership structure in one person (i.e., where the CEO also serves 
simultaneously as the chairperson) reduces the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring regarding 
potential domination of the board. This is because the manager who initiates and implements important 
decisions (as CEO) also has to control and monitor these decisions (as chairperson), and therefore may 
take decisions that benefit him/her at the expense of shareholders’ interests (Barako et al., 2006; Khalil 
and Maghraby, 2017; Pillai et al., 2018). Thus, separating the two roles can improve the quality of 
monitoring (Hassoun and Aloui, 2017), and thereby improving corporate transparency (Haniff and 
Cook, 2002; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Similarly, legitimacy theory suggests that separation of the 
two roles can improve checks and balances over management performance. If a CEO controls board 
meetings, determines agenda items, and selects board members, this can exacerbate the level of agency 
problems between management and owners (Haniff and Cook, 2002, 2005), which may have a negative 
impact on the legitimacy of managerial decisions.  
Despite the conflicting results reported in the literature, the majority of empirical evidence has 
supported the negative impact of CEO role duality on the extent of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Haniff 
and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 2012). Other studies have 
found no significant association between the two variables (e.g., Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008; Al-Shemary and Al-Soultan, 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a; Khalil and 
Maghraby, 2017; Alnabsha et al., 2018). On the other hand, Al-Janadi et al., (2016), using 87 companies 
from the Saudi stock market, find that the separation of CEO and chairperson positions has a negative 
significant impact on voluntary CG disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, our second non-
directional hypothesis is as follows: 
H2. There is an association between combining the board leadership position and CEO and 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.   
 
3.3 Family shareholdings and voluntary disclosure 
Firms that are controlled by founding families tend to experience lower agency problems arising from 
the separation of ownership and management (Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Chau and Gray, 2010). Family 
owners are more likely to keep their shareholdings on a long-term basis (Anderson et al., 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), have better access to information, and exercise closer monitoring of 
management, leading to lower demand for corporate voluntary disclosure (Chen et al., 2008, Ali et al., 
2007; Chau and Gray, 2010). Ali et al. (2007) argue that family shareholders prefer to provide low 
levels of disclosures relating to their CG practices in order to facilitate employing family members on 
board without much interference from non-family shareholders.  
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 Employing 4,415 observations from US listed firms in the period 1996–2000, Chen et al. 
(2008) find that family firms disclose lower voluntary information compared to non-family firms. 
Likewise, Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms provides lower disclosure about their CG practices 
compared to their non-family counterparts. By contrast, Chau and Gray (2010) report positive effect of 
higher family shareholding (more than 25%) on voluntary disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, 
our third non-directional hypothesis is as follows: 
H3. There is an association between family shareholdings and the level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
3.4 Director shareholdings and voluntary disclosure 
Director shareholdings probably influence decisions regarding voluntary CG disclosure practices (Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). From an agency theory perspective, higher director 
shareholdings can mitigate agency conflicts between directors and shareholders by aligning their 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi, 2014; Khlif et al., 2017; Pillai et al., 
2018). Consequently, corporate boards need not strive hard in order to enhance voluntary CG disclosure 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012; Alnabsha et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, and from the legitimisation perspective, firms with lower director shareholdings tend to 
invest more in CG practices and voluntary CG disclosure in order to enhance company legitimacy and 
stakeholder confidence in the board (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006).    
Empirically, existing evidence has indicated a negative association between director 
shareholdings and voluntary disclosure of CG practices (e.g., Hussain and Al-Najjar, 2012; Albitar, 
2015; Khlif et al., 2017). However, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Samaha et al. (2012) and Alnabsha 
et al., (2018) report an insignificant impact. Thus, based on these arguments, our fourth hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H4. There is a negative association between director shareholdings and the level of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. 
 
3.5 Government shareholdings and voluntary disclosure   
Corporations with high government shareholdings seek to gain government support by engaging in 
good CG practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). This is because winning the support of government 
cannot only help in legitimatising corporate operations (legitimacy theory) (Aguilera et al., 2007), but 
also aid in gaining essential resources, such as subsidies, tax exemptions and contracts that can improve 
company performance (resource dependence theory) (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, a number 
of studies argue that higher levels of state shareholdings, with wide and powerful political connections, 
provide protection against review and discipline by regulatory authorities (e.g., Jia et al., 2009; Hou 
and Moore, 2010; Khlif et al., 2017; Alnabsha et al., 2018). Al-Janadi et al., (2016) report that 
government shareholdings have a moderating negative effect on the association between CG factors 
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(board size and non-executive directors (NEDs)) and voluntary disclosure. This indicates that 
government shareholdings can have a negative effect on the effectiveness of CG structures in a firm. 
Consequently, firms with high government shareholdings are less likely to voluntarily disclose CG 
practices. 
Empirically, there is a lack of studies examining the association between government 
shareholdings and the extent of voluntary disclosure in emerging markets in general and MENA 
countries in particular. Eng and Mak (2003), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), Kolsi (2017) and Al-Bassam 
et al. (2018) have documented that government shareholdings impact positively on voluntary disclosure 
practices in emerging markets. On the other hand, Al-Janadi et al., (2016) and Alotaibi and Hussainey 
(2016) find a negative significant impact of state shareholdings on voluntary disclosure, while Alnabsha 
et al., (2018) report an insignificant impact. Thus, based on these arguments and mixed results, our final 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H5. There is an association between government shareholdings and the level of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure.                         
 
4. Data and research methodology  
4.1 Data: sample selection, sources, and description  
Our sample is based on 494 non-financial and non-utility corporations listed on the national stock 
exchanges of five MENA countries namely, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab of 
Emirates at the end of 2014. We exclude financials and utilities because they are subject to different 
regulations and have different capital structures, which may affect their disclosure and CG practices 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). We collected data relating to CG attributes and 
CG disclosure by hand from the annual financial reports over the period 2009 to 2014. Because 
traditional manual content analysis consumes a considerable amount of time and effort, and in line with 
similar past disclosure studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Donnelly and Malcahy, 2008; 
Ahmed et al., 2017; Anifowose et al., 2017), we collected data on 600 firm year observations from 100 
corporations employing the widely used stratified sampling technique based on firm size and industry 
in each country, as illustrated in Table 1. Noticeably, our sample is much larger than most past 
accounting and disclosure studies that have been conducted in emerging economies that have employed 
similar stratified sampling techniques (Barako et al., 2006; Ahmed et al., 2017; Anifowose et al., 2017). 
Thus, our sampling approach and data arguably constitute a discernible improvement on existing 
studies, including being distinctively: (i) cross-country; and (ii) longitudinal in nature. Data on board 
characteristics and shareholding structures were manually collected from firms’ annual reports and 
websites of sampled countries’ capital markets. Financial and accounting variables were collected from 
DataStream database.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.2 Research methodology: definition of variables and model specification 
We group our variables into three, namely: (i) dependent; (ii) independent; and (iii) control variables, 
which are also reported in Appendix 1 and Table 2 with detailed information regarding how each 
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variable was operationalised. First, our main dependent variable is the CG index (GINDEX). This index 
follows a checklist developed by the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International 
Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), organised by the United Nations Conference Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, 2006). This checklist (“UNCTAD ISAR benchmark”) of guidance on 
good practice in CG disclosure was based on five sections used to construct 5 sub-indices: (i) ownership 
structure and exercise of control rights (OSH); (ii) financial transparency (TCY); (iii) auditing (AUD); 
(iv) corporate responsibility and compliance (RTY); and (v) board and management structure and 
process (BMS). The GINDEX is constructed by awarding a value of ‘1’ if each of the 51 CG provisions 
is disclosed and ‘0’ otherwise. With this binary scoring scheme, a firm’s total disclosure score in a 
particular firm year can vary between 0 (perfect non-compliance and non-disclosure) and 100% (perfect 
compliance and disclosure). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Independent variables are: (i) board characteristics, including, gender and ethnicity diversity 
within the board of directors (DIV) and unitary of board leadership (UBL), and (ii) shareholding 
structures including, family shareholdings (FSH), director shareholdings (DSH) and government 
shareholdings (GSH). We include a number of control variables that may have an impact on voluntary 
CG disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Hanifa and Cooke, 2002; Donnelly and Malcahy, 2008; Albitar, 
2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Kolsi, 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). These control variables include board 
size (BRDS), audit firm size (AFSIZ), firm size (LNTA), firm age (AGE), growth opportunity (GRTH), 
leverage (LV), profitability (PROFIT), dummy variables for the year of operation (DYER), dummy 
variables for industry (DIND), and dummy variables for countries (DCOU). 
 The following OLS regression model is used assuming that all relations are linear:  
)1(
1
543210 


n
i
ititiitititititit CONTROLSGSHDSHFSHUBLDIVGINDEX 
 
Where GINDEX refers to overall MENA countries’ CG disclosure index. DIV refers to board 
diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity. UBL refers to unitary of board leadership. FSH refers 
to family shareholdings, DSH refers to director shareholdings. GSH refers to government shareholdings. 
CONTROLS refers to firm-level control variables, namely, board size (BRDS), audit firm size (AFSIZ), 
firm size (LNTA), firm age (AGE), growth opportunity (GRTH), leverage (LV), profitability (PROFIT), 
year dummies (DYER), industry dummies (DIND), and country dummies (DCOU).  
 
 
5. Empirical results and discussions 
5.1 Empirical results: descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis  
Table 3 contains summary descriptive analysis of the main dependent, independent and control 
variables over the 6 years investigated (2009-2014). Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for 
the overall (GINDEX) index and its sub-indices. GINDEX shows wide variation, ranging from a 
minimum of 31.37% (16 out of 51) to a maximum of 84.31% (43 out of 51), with the average (median) 
firm complying with 56.45 % (56.86%) of the 51 CG provisions examined. With regard to the 
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GINDEX’s 5 sub-indices, they also show substantial differences in their descriptive analysis. For 
example, ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH) ranges from a minimum compliance 
rate of 22.22% to a maximum of 100%, with the average firm complying with 63.31% of the 9 CG 
provisions investigated. Also, board and management structure and process (BMS) ranges from a 
minimum compliance rate of 22.22% to a maximum of 88.89%, with the average firm complying with 
58.09% of the 18 CG provisions investigated. Thus, the descriptive statistics indicate considerable 
variations in the level of compliance and disclosure for both the overall GINDEX and its 5 sub-indices, 
which are consistent with the evidence of past CG disclosure studies in MENA countries (e.g., Samaha 
et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015, Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam 
et al., 2018). Accordingly, despite the existing CG codes, MENA listed firms generally show a lower 
extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, the overall GINDEX and its 5 sub-indices along with 
significant disparities at this level compared to developing countries [2]. These findings support the 
view that implementation and enforcement of corporate regulations, such as best CG practices are weak, 
and thereby leading to low levels of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice 
recommendations in MENA countries (Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi 
et al., 2016; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Md Zaini et al., 2018)   
Insert Table 3 about here 
 The descriptive statistics for independent and control variables are reported in Panels D and E 
of Table 3, respectively. Starting with independent variables, board diversity (DIV) on the basis of both 
gender and ethnic minority ranges from 0% to 69.23% with an average of 7.88%, which suggests that 
on average MENA listed firms’ boards are dominated by Arab men. Board diversity on the basis of 
gender (DIVG) and ethnic minority (DIVE) ranges from 0% to 37.50% and 66.67%, respectively, with 
averages of 2.71% and 5.20%. Limited sampled firms have unitary board leadership structure (UBL) 
with an average of 21%. Shareholding structure mechanisms show variation, where family 
shareholdings (FSH), director shareholdings (DSH), and government shareholdings (GSH) range from 
a minimum of 1.08%, 0% and 0% to a maximum of 100%, 98.92% and 98.67% with an average of 
49.85%, 44.94% and 16.15%, respectively. Board and shareholding statistics are consistent with the 
findings of previous studies conducted in MENA countries (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012; Elghuweel et al., 
2017: Al-Bassam et al., 2018).  
To provide further informative inferences from our analysis, we divided the total sampled firm-
years into two sub-groups: (i) firms with high GINDEX scores (i.e., firms with a GINDEX scores above 
the overall mean/median value); and (ii) firms with low GINDEX scores (i.e., firms with a GINDEX 
score below the overall mean/median value). Columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 report the findings of the t-
test, comparing mean and median differences for our independent and control variables. Generally, the 
findings reported show that the two sub-groups have significant differences in the means and medians 
between both of them. For instance, the mean is significantly different between the two sub-samples as 
follows: board gender and ethnicity diversity (3.66); board gender diversity (-1.45); board ethnicity 
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diversity (5.15); unitary board leadership structure (-40.00); family shareholdings (4.61); and 
government shareholdings (6.69). Our findings suggest that firms with more diverse boards and with 
high family and government shareholdings are more likely to engage in greater compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG practices. On the other hand, firms with greater gender diverse boards, and have 
unitary board leadership structure are more likely to engage in low compliance with, and disclosure of, 
CG practices. 
The OLS regression technique is used to test all the current studies hypotheses, and thus a  
number of OLS regression diagnostics assumptions were examined, including multicollinearity , 
autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. Table 4 presents the correlation matrix 
(including both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients) for the variables to 
test for multicollinearity. The direction and magnitude of both coefficients are generally similar, hence 
suggesting that any remaining non-normalities may not pose a serious statistical problem. Noticeably, 
the bivariate correlations among the variables are also averagely low, indicating that any remaining 
multicollinearity problems may not be statistically harmful. In addition, the authors investigated (for 
brevity not presented here, but available on request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, histograms, skewness 
and kurtosis, VIF, tolerance statistics, Breusch-Pagan test, Cook’s distance, leverage values, and 
Durbin-Watson statistic. The results from these tests suggesting no serious violation of the OLS 
assumptions, except that some of the continuous variables (DIV, DIVG, DIVE, GRTH) are not normally 
distributed, thus and in line with previous studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Samaha et al., 2012), these 
variables were transferred into ranks based on normal scores before running the OLS regression analysis 
[3].  
Interestingly and as expected, Table 5 indicates that board diversity based on ethnicity (DIVE), 
government shareholdings (GSH), audit firm size (AFSIZ), firm size (LNTA), growth opportunity 
(GRTH), leverage (LV), and profitability (PROFIT) have a statistically significant positive relationship 
with the GINDEX. On the other hand, the correlation matrix shows that GINDEX has a negative 
significant correlation with board diversity based on gender (DIVG), unitary board leadership (UBL), 
director shareholdings (DSH), and firm age (AGE).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
5.2 Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis 
Models 1 to 4 of Table 5 reports the findings of the cross-sectional pooled OLS regressions for the 
model examining the effect of board characteristics and shareholding structures on the extent of 
disclosure and compliance with CG practices. The results contained in Model 4, which is the study’s 
main model, generally indicate that the independent variables (board characteristics and shareholding 
structures) are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in the voluntary CG disclosures. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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The results in Model 4 of Table 5 suggest that DIV is significantly and positively related to the 
GINDEX, which offers empirical support for H1. Theoretically, the result is largely in line with the 
predictions of our multi-theoretical framework that draws insights from agency, resource dependence, 
legitimacy, and stakeholder theories, which suggest a positive effect of board diversity on voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices. Empirically, the findings are consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). However, Model 3 in Table 5 shows that board 
diversity based on gender (DIVG) is positively, but insignificantly associated with GINDEX, while 
boards with members from diverse ethnic minorities (DIVE) are positively and significantly associated 
with the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
Unitary board leadership (UBL) has a negative and significant association with GINDEX, which 
supports H2. Theoretically, this finding is consistent with agency theory that suggests that boards with 
separate roles of chairperson and CEO are more likely to voluntarily comply and disclose CG practices. 
Also it enhances the legitimacy of managerial decisions by developing checks and balances over 
management’s performance and reducing advantages gained from withholding information (legitimacy 
theory). Empirically, the results support previous studies which have documented a positive and 
significant association between separate CEO/chairperson roles and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
of CG practices (e.g., Haniff and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 
2012). Economically, the implications of this findings can be quantified as, a one standard deviation 
change in DIV and UBL may be associated with about 1.43% (14.34% × 0.100) and .65% (40.90% × 
0.016) change in the level of the GINDEX, respectively.  
The results in Model 4 of Table 5 suggest that FSH is statistically insignificant related to the 
GINDEX, implying that family shareholdings of MENA listed firms have no significant impact on the 
level of CG practices. This finding does not offer empirical support for agency theory, which suggests 
that family shareholdings provide closer managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry that 
is usually minimise agency problems, and hence a lesser need for increased CG disclosures (Chen et 
al., 2008, Ali et al., 2007; Chau and Gray, 2010). We interpret this as indicating that family investors 
may have more efficient and timely channels for extracting value relevant information. Thus, family 
shareholdings are not related to our disclosure index, which captures more formal disclosures in the 
annual report. Empirically, our finding is inconsistent with previous studies that have reported 
significant association between family shareholdings and voluntary CG disclosure (Chen et al., 2008; 
Ali et al., 2007; Chau and Gray, 2010).  
With respect to DSH, the findings in Model 4 of Table 5 suggests that DSH is statistically 
significant and negatively related to the GINDEX, implying that MENA listed firms with more director 
shareholdings provide less voluntary disclosure of CG practices. This finding offers empirical support 
for our multi-theoretical framework, which argues that firms with lower director shareholdings tend to 
invest more in CG practices to enhance company’s legitimacy and stakeholder confidence in the board 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). This also supports H6 and the findings of past 
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studies, which suggest that DSH affects negatively on voluntary CG disclosure (Hussain and Al-Najjar, 
2012; Albitar, 2015; Khlif et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the findings in Model 4 of Table 5 also suggest that GSH is statistically significant 
and negatively related to the GINDEX, therefore H5 is empirically supported. Although, some 
theoretical evidence suggests that firms with high government shareholding are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose good CG practices to facilitate gaining essential resources (resource dependence 
theory) (Haniffa and Huddaib, 2006), to mitigate agency conflict between management and owners 
(agency theory) (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Khlif et al., 2017), and to legitimise its operations 
(legitimacy theory) (Alguilera et al., 2007). Empirically, the negative association between government 
shareholdings and GINDEX is congruent with the finding of Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) and Al-
Janadi et al., (2016) suggesting that governments in MENA countries with significant shareholdings 
have no interest in providing sufficient information to mitigate agency conflict, and that the objective 
of the state when it has a controlling stake in companies is to attain political and social objectives, rather 
than shareholder value maximization (Piesse et al., 2011). The economic relevance of these findings 
are that a one standard deviation change (increase) in DSH and GSH may be associated with about 
1.14% (27.90% × 0.041) and 1.03% (24.60% × 0.042) change (decrease) in the level of the GINDEX, 
respectively. 
The main CG index used in this study (GINDEX) contains five sub-indices. To infer the 
association between board characteristics and shareholding structures with the five sub-indices and 
assess whether these relations differ from the overall GINDEX, Table 6 shows the results of the OLS 
regression of the explanatory and control variables on the five sub-indices. For example, the coefficients 
of DIV (except for OSH and BMS) remain significant and positively associated with the five sub-indices. 
Similarly, the coefficients of DSH (except for TCY and BMS), GSH (except for TCY) are negatively and 
significantly associated with the five sub-indices, while the coefficients of FSH remains insignificant ly 
associated with all the five sub-indices. Generally, the findings presented in Table 6 empirically support 
the former results illustrated in Table 5. The observed sensitivities in the coefficients implying that 
MENA corporations differ in terms of the importance that they attach to the various categories of the 
CG best practices. Finally, the coefficients of the control variables in Table 5 are generally consistent 
with expectations. For example, the coefficients of AFSIZ, LNTA, and PROFIT are positively associated 
with the GINDEX, whereas the coefficient of AGE is negatively related to the GINDEX.  
 
6. Robustness tests     
The study carries out further analyses to examine the robustness of our findings. First, and as previously 
explained, all the 51 provisions constituting the GINDEX are equally weighted, but the number of 
provisions varies across the five sub-indices, resulting in different weights being assigned to each sub-
index: OSH, 17.6%; TCY, 15.7%; auditing, 17.6%; RTY, 13.7%; and BMS, 35.3%. Accordingly, an 
alternative index (W-GINDEX) is created in which each of the five sub-indices is assigned an equal 
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weight of 20% to find out whether the results hold regardless of the weighting of the five sub-indices. 
Model 1 of Table 7 shows that our results are largely consistent with those obtained using the non-
weighted CG index (GINDEX) presented in Model 4 of Table 5.  
Second, to investigate the existence of a non-linear association between (FSH), (DSH), and 
(GSH), and voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices, Model 4 in Table 5 has been 
re-estimated by adding the square root of family shareholdings (FSH2), director shareholdings (DSH2), 
and government shareholdings (GSH2). The results are documented in Model 2 of Table 7. The findings 
in Model 2 illustrate that the association between DSH2 or GSH2 and GINDEX is statistically 
insignificant, supporting the absence of a curvilinear relationship between these variables and voluntary 
CG disclosure. On the other hand, our findings show that FSH2 has a positive and significant impact on 
GINDEX, suggesting that family shareholdings become more entrenched at higher levels of ownership, 
which is consistent with theoretical suggestions that high family ownership increases the information 
asymmetry problem between controlling and minority shareholders, therefore firms may increase the 
extent of corporate disclosure to reduce agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Chau and Gray, 2010; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017).  
Third, to address potential endogeneity problems that may arise from a simultaneous 
relationship between the board/shareholding mechanisms and the CG disclosures, a lagged structure 
was estimated by introducing a one year gap between the CG disclosures and board characteristics and 
ownership mechanisms. The results reported in Model 3 of Table 7 is largely similar to those contained 
in Model 4 of Table 5, suggesting that the study’s findings are generally robust to possible endogeneity 
problems that may result from the simultaneous link between board characteristics, shareholding 
mechanisms, and the GINDEX. Fourth, and in order to address potential endogeneities that might arise 
as a result of omitted variables, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model was estimated. First, the 
probability of an existence of an endogenous relationship between board characteristics and 
shareholding structure mechanisms on the one hand, and GINDEX on the other hand, was examined by 
a Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (following Beiner et al., 2006). The results reject the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity. Consequently, estimating a 2SLS test using a CG mechanisms instrument 
that will be more correlated with CG mechanisms, but less with the regression structural errors, will 
seem more appropriate than the OLS model. The findings reported in Model 4 of Table 7 essentially 
suggest that the results of the OLS model presented in Model 4 of Table 6 are robust to the existence of 
endogeneities that may be caused by omitted variables.  
Fourth, we know that CG disclosure may be affected by other firm-specific opportunities and 
difficulties that corporations encounter and tend to vary over time (Henry, 2008). Therefore, a fixed-
effect model was estimated to address potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities that the OLS 
regression model may fail to control (Henry, 2008; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). The estimated fixed-effect 
model is based on the re-estimation of Model 4 in Table 6, by including 99 dummies to represent the 
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100 sampled firms. The findings illustrated in Model 5 of Table 7 imply that the study’s findings are 
robust to potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.  
Finally, a considerable number of evidence suggests that firm size can influence the extent to 
which firms disclose their CG practices (Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al. 2016; Habbash et al., 
2016). Therefore and to ascertain the possible impact of firm size on the voluntary disclosure–CG 
relationship, we split the sample into two sub-samples using high (i.e., above the median score) and low 
(i.e., below the sample median score) median scores. In general, the findings presented in Models 6 and 
7 of Table 7 indicate that larger firms are more likely to have sufficient resources to bear the cost of 
complying with CG rules compared with their smaller counterparts (Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et 
al. 2016; Habbash et al., 2016). To sum up, the evidence resulting from the study’s additional analyses 
suggest that the study’s findings appear not to be sensitive to different endogenous relationships.        
 
7. Summary and conclusion  
Although recent decades have witnessed increasing interest in the study of international corporate 
governance, the literature examining MENA countries level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG 
practices is still limited. Consequently, this study investigates the extent of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, good CG practices among firms listed in MENA countries. Specifically, it examines 
whether board characteristics and shareholding structures can explain cross-sectional variations in the 
extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices in MENA countries using a multi-
theoretical framework.  
 MENA countries have recently recognised the importance of efficient national securities 
markets that comply with international CG practices. Since the early 1990s, negative net capital 
importing countries, including Egypt and Jordan have commenced economic reform programmes 
targeting securities markets as important vehicles to accelerate the implementation and success of those 
reforms. Likewise, positive net capital exporting countries, including Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have recently recognised the importance of functional 
securities markets as an alternative channels for finance and investment. Furthermore, another objective 
of most MENA countries’ economic reform programmes is to attract private and foreign direct 
investments. Therefore, enhancing the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices 
in MENA countries may arguably help in improving the reputation of the region for foreign direct 
investments.  
Hence and employing a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, 
legitimacy, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of board 
characteristics (i.e., gender and ethnic diversity within the board of directors and unitary of board 
leadership) and shareholding structures (i.e., family shareholdings, director shareholdings, and 
government shareholdings) on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in firms listed in 
MENA countries. The findings from this study suggest that board characteristics and shareholding 
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structures are generally significant in explaining differences in the voluntary CG disclosures. 
Specifically, the study’s results suggest that corporations with diversified boards based on gender and 
ethnicity disclose considerably more than those that are not. By contrast, our findings suggest that 
unitary board leadership and an increase in director and government shareholdings significantly reduce 
the amount of voluntary CG disclosures. In contrast, the role of family investors as active monitors of 
managers is statistically negligible. 
 The study’s findings have important implications for regulators, policy-makers, managers, and 
corporations not only in MENA countries, but also in other developing countries and emerging markets 
intending to pursue CG reforms. For example, the high degree of heterogeneity among MENA listed 
firms in terms of the levels of CG compliance supports the argument that most listed companies in these 
countries do not adhere to disclosure and transparency requirements, given the lack of legislative 
enforcement. Therefore, this suggests that there is a need for the regulatory authorities and policy- 
makers to further enhance CG compliance and enforcement. This can be achieved by strengthening 
legislative enforcement and establishing a “compliance and enforcement” unit that will continuously 
observe the implementation of CG practices. Likewise, as the presence of low director shareholdings, 
and low government shareholdings are demonstrated to have a positive effect on good CG practices, it 
provides the national stock exchanges the impetus to implement measures that will encourage 
reductions in the level of director and government shareholdings of MENA listed corporations. Also, 
for managers and corporations, our evidence suggests that they can improve their CG standards by 
diversifying their boards and separating CEO and board chairperson positions with the view of 
enhancing the process of monitoring firms’ compliance with best CG practices. 
 Finally, although the findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models, 
there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged. This study depends on a relatively limited 
sample size (i.e., 600 firm-year observations collected from five MENA economies) because the data 
was collected manually, which was labour intensive. Thus, future studies could employ a much larger 
sample that may help enhance generalisability of their findings. Similarly, the study investigated the 
impact of a relatively limited set of firm-level internal CG mechanisms (i.e., board characteristics and 
shareholding structures) on CG disclosure. Future studies might examine the impact of other sets of 
internal CG mechanisms (e.g., board of directors’ efficiency and frequency of meetings, and existence 
and characteristics of the audit committee), along with other external CG characteristics (e.g., 
government regulations, media exposure, market competition, and takeover activities), and county-level 
cultural factors (e.g., national governance quality, cultural and religious practices, and social norms) on 
voluntary CG disclosure. Finally, annual reports can sometimes carry mixed messages. Therefore, 
future studies may improve on the study’s evidence by employing qualitative approaches, such as 
conducting in-depth face-to-face interviews with relevant stakeholders, such as auditors, company 
directors, and investors. This may provide a better understanding of the different determinants of 
voluntary CG disclosures. 
20 
 
Notes 
1. Oman was the first country in the MENA region to issue a national CG code, in 2002 (3 June 
2002, according to Circular number 11/2002, which was later amended by Circular number 
1/2003 for public listed companies). 
2. Mateescu (2015) and Elmagrhi et al., (2016), for example, report that the average compliance 
with national CG codes by four of Europe’s emerging countries and UK listed firms were 86% 
and 61.73%, respectively. 
3. VIF values that have been reported in Tables 5 to 7 indicate that there are no statistically 
harmful problems relating to potential multicollinearities, as all the VIF values are observably 
lower than 10 (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Reference  
Aguilera, R. V., Rupp, D. E., Williams, C. A., and Ganapathi, J. (2007), “Putting the S back in corporate 
social responsibility: A multilevel theory of social change in organizations”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 32 No.3, pp. 836-863. 
Ahmed, A. H., Burton, B. M., and Dunne, T. M. (2017), “The determinants of corporate internet 
reporting in Egypt: an exploratory analysis”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol.7 
No.1, pp. 35-60. 
Al-Bassam, W. M., Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K., and Downs, Y. (2018), “Corporate Boards and 
Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly 
Listed Corporations”, Business & Society, Vol. 57 No. 2, pp. 335–377. 
Albitar, K. (2015) “Firm Characteristics, Governance Attributes and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: 
A Study of Jordanian Listed Companies”, International Business Research, Vol. 8 No.3, pp.1-10. 
Ali, A., Chen, T. Y., and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007) “Corporate disclosures by family firms”, Journal 
of accounting and economics, Vol. 44 No.1, pp.238-286. 
Al-Janadi, Y., Abdul Rahman, R., and Alazzani, A. (2016), “Does government ownership affect 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure? Evidence from Saudi Arabia”, Managerial Auditing 
Journal, Vol. 31 No. 8/9, pp.871-890. 
Aljifri, K., Alzarouni, A., Ng, C., and Tahir, M. I. (2014), “The Association between Firm 
Characteristics and Corporate Financial Disclosures: Evidence from UAE Companies”, The 
International Journal of Business and Finance Research , Vol. 8 No.2, pp.101-123. 
Alnabsha, A., Abdou, H. A., Ntim, C. G., and Elamer, A. A. (2018), “Corporate boards, ownership 
structures and corporate disclosures: Evidence from a developing country”, Journal of Applied 
Accounting Research, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp.20-41.  
Alotaibi, K. O., and Hussainey, K. (2016), “Determinants of CSR disclosure quantity and quality: 
Evidence from non-financial listed firms in Saudi Arabia”, International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance, Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 364-393. 
Alsaeed, K. (2006), “The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: The case of 
Saudi Arabia”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21 No.5, pp. 476-496. 
Al-Shammari, B., and Al-Sultan, W. (2010), “Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in 
Kuwait” International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Vol .7 No.3, p. 262-280. 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., and Reeb, D. M. (2003), “Founding family ownership and the agency 
cost of debt”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68 No.2, pp.263-285. 
Anifowose, M., Abdul Rashid, H. M., and Annuar, H. A. (2017), “Intellectual capital disclosure and 
corporate market value: does board diversity matter?”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging 
Economies, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 369-398. 
21 
 
Barako, D. G., Hancock, P., and Izan, H. Y. (2006), “Factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure 
by Kenyan companies” Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14 No.2, pp. 107-125. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M. M., and Zimmermann, H. (2006), “An integrated framework of 
corporate governance and firm valuation”, European Financial Management, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 
249-283. 
Bin-Ghanem, H. and Ariff, A. M. (2016), “The effect of board of directors and audit committee 
effectiveness on internet financial reporting: Evidence from gulf co-operation council 
countries” Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 6 No.4, pp. 429-448. 
Chau, G., and Gray, S. J. (2010), “Family ownership, board independence and voluntary disclosure: 
Evidence from Hong Kong”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 19 
No.2, pp. 93-109. 
Chen, S., Chen, X. I. A., and Cheng, Q. (2008), “Do family firms provide more or less voluntary 
disclosure?”, Journal of Accounting Research , Vol. 46 No.3, pp. 499-536. 
Cheng, E. C., and Courtenay, S. M. (2006), “Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary 
disclosure”, The International Journal of Accounting , Vol. 41 No.3, pp. 262-289. 
Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013), “Corporate governance in emerging markets: A 
survey” Emerging Markets Review, Vol. 15, pp.1-33. 
Coffie, W., Aboagye-Otchere, F., and Musah, A. (2018). Corporate social responsibility disclosures 
(CSRD), corporate governance and the degree of multinational activities: Evidence from a 
developing economy. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 106-123. 
Cooke, T. E. (1989), “Voluntary corporate disclosure by Swedish companies”, Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting , Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 171-195. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998), “Meta-analytic reviews of board 
composition, leadership structure, and financial performance” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
19 No.3, pp. 269-290. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981), “Auditor size and audit quality”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 
3 No. 3, pp. 183-199. 
Dimitropoulos, P. E., & Asteriou, D. (2010), “The effect of board composition on the informativeness 
and quality of annual earnings: Empirical evidence from Greece”, Research in International 
Business and Finance, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 190-205. 
Donnelly, R., & Mulcahy, M. (2008), “Board structure, ownership, and voluntary disclosure in 
Ireland”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.16 No.5, pp.416-429. 
Ebaid, E. I. (2013), “Corporate governance and investors' perceptions of earnings quality: Egyptian 
perspective”, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society , Vol. 13 
No.3, pp. 261-273. 
Elghuweel, M. I., Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K., & Avison, L. (2017), “Corporate governance, Islamic 
governance and earnings management in Oman: A new empirical insights from a behavioural 
theoretical framework” Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 7 No.2, pp. 190-224. 
Elkelish, W. W. (2017), “IFRS related party transactions disclosure and firm valuation in the United 
Arab Emirates emerging market”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 
173-189. 
Elmagrhi, M. H., Ntim, C., and Wang, Y. (2016), “Antecedents of Voluntary Corporate Governance 
Disclosure: A Post-2007/08 Financial Crisis Evidence from the Influential UK Combined 
Code”, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol 16 No. 3, pp. 
507-538. 
Eng, L. L., and Mak, Y. T. (2003), “Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure”, Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22 No.4, pp.325-345. 
Ghazali, N. A. M., & Weetman, P. (2006), “Perpetuating traditional influences: Voluntary disclosure 
in Malaysia following the economic crisis”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 226-248. 
22 
 
Gilson, R. J., and Gordon, J. N. (2003), “Controlling controlling shareholders. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, No. 2, pp. 785-843. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003), “Corporate governance and equity prices”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 No.1, pp.107-156. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003), “Basic econometrics”, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Gul, F. A., Zhou, G. S., & Zhu, X. K. (2013), “Investor protection, firm informational problems, Big N 
auditors, and cost of debt around the world”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 32 No. 
3, pp. 1-30. 
Habbash, M., Hussainey, K., and Awad, E. (2016), “The determinants of voluntary disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia: an empirical study”, International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance 
Evaluation, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 213-236. 
Haniffa, R. M., and Cooke, T. E. (2002), “Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian 
corporations”, Abacus, Vol. 38 No.3, pp. 317-349. 
Haniffa, R. M., and Cooke, T. E. (2005), “The impact of culture and governance on corporate social 
reporting”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 24 No.5, pp. 391-430. 
Haniffa, R., and Hudaib, M. (2006), “Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian 
listed companies”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting , Vol. 33 No.7‐8, pp. 1034-1062. 
Haniffa, R., and Hudaib, M. (2007), “Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural context: The 
case of Saudi Arabia”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 16 No.2, 
pp. 179-206. 
Hassoun, A. B., and Aloui, C. (2017), “The complementary/substitution effects of post-privatization 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in selected MENA countries”, Journal of 
Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 7 No.3, pp. 399-420. 
Henry, D. (2008), “Corporate governance structure and the valuation of Australian firms: is there value 
in ticking the boxes?”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting , Vol. 35 No.7‐8, pp. 912-942. 
Hessayri, M., and Saihi, M. (2018), “Ownership dynamics around IFRS adoption: emerging markets 
context”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 2-28. 
Hou, W., & Moore, G. (2010), “Players and referee roles held jointly: The effect of state ownership on 
China's regulatory enforcement against fraud”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 95, pp. 317–335. 
Hussainey, K., and Al‐Najjar, B. (2012), “Understanding the determinants of Risk Metrics/ISS ratings 
of the quality of UK companies' corporate governance practice”, Canadian Journal of 
Administrative, Vol.29 No.4, pp. 366-377. 
Ibrahim, A. H., and Hanefah, M. M., (2014). “Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Jordan”, 3rd International Conference on Management, Economics and Finance (ICMEF), 27- 28 
October, Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu, Malaysia.  
Jensen, M. C. (1993), “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48 No 3, pp. 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs 
and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305–360. 
Jia, C., Ding, S., Li, Y., & Wu, Z. (2009), “Fraud, enforcement action, and the role of corporate 
governance: Evidence from China”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 90 No. 4, pp. 561-576. 
Kamel, H., and Awadallah, E. (2017), “The extent of voluntary corporate disclosure in the Egyptian 
Stock Exchange: Its determinants and consequences”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging 
Economies, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 266-291. 
Khalil, A., and Maghraby, M. (2017), “The determinants of internet risk disclosure: empirical study of 
Egyptian listed companies”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 32 No. 8, pp. 746-767. 
Khlif, H., Ahmed, K., and Souissi, M. (2017), “Ownership structure and voluntary disclosure: A 
synthesis of empirical studies”, Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 376-403. 
23 
 
Kolsi, M. C. (2017), “The determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure policy: Evidence from the 
Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX)”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 7 
No.2, pp. 249-265. 
Lagoarde-Segot, T., and Lucey, B. M. (2008), “Efficiency in emerging markets-Evidence from the 
MENA region” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money , Vol. 18 No.1, 
pp. 94-105. 
Lilienfeld‐Toal, U. V., & Ruenzi, S. (2014), “CEO ownership, stock market performance, and 
managerial discretion”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 69 No.3, pp. 1013-1050. 
Mateescu, R. A. (2015), “Corporate governance disclosure practices and their determinant factors in 
European emerging countries”, Journal of Accounting and Management Information Systems, Vol. 
14 No. 1, pp. 170-192. 
Md Zaini, S., Samkin, G., Sharma, U., and Davey, H. (2018), “Voluntary disclosure in emerging 
countries: a literature review”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 29-
65. 
Moideenkutty, U., Al-Lamki, A., and Sree Rama Murthy, Y. (2011), “HRM practices and 
organizational performance in Oman”, Personnel Review, Vol. 40 No.2, pp. 239-251. 
Ntim, C. G., and Soobaroyen, T. (2013), “Corporate governance and performance in socially 
responsible Corporations: New empirical insights from a neo‐institutional framework”, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 21 No.5, pp. 468-494. 
Ntim, C. G., Lindop, S., & Thomas, D. A. (2013), “Corporate governance and risk reporting in South 
Africa: A study of corporate risk disclosures in the pre-and post-2007/2008 global financial crisis 
periods”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 30, pp. 363-383. 
Ntim, C.G. (2016), “Corporate governance, corporate health accounting and firm value: The case of 
HIV/AIDS disclosures in Sub-Saharan Africa”, International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 51 No. 2, 
pp.155-216. 
Ntim, C.G., Soobaroyen, T., and Broad, M.J. (2017), “Governance structures, voluntary disclosures and 
public accountability: The case of UK higher education institutions’, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp.65-118. 
Omran, M. M., Bolbol, A., & Fatheldin, A. (2008), “Corporate governance and firm performance in 
Arab equity markets: Does ownership concentration matter?”, International Review of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 28 No.1, pp. 32-45. 
Piesse, J., Strange, R., and Toonsi, F. (2012), “Is there a distinctive MENA model of corporate 
governance?” Journal of Management & Governance , Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 645-681. 
Pillai, R., and Al-Malkawi, H. A. N. (2018), “On the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance: Evidence from GCC countries”, Research in International Business and Finance, 
Forthcoming. 
Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K., and Stapleton, P. (2012), “The extent of corporate governance 
disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt”, Advances in 
Accounting, Vol. 28 No.1, pp. 168-178. 
Soobaroyen, T., Tsamenyi, M., and Sapra, H. (2017), “Accounting and governance in Africa–
contributions and opportunities for further research”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging 
Economies, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 422-427. 
Tauringana, V., and Mangena, M. (2014), “Board structure and supplementary commentary on the 
primary financial statements”, Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 15 No.3, pp.273-290. 
UNCTAD (2006), “2006 Review of the implementation status of corporate governance disclosures. 
Report”, TD/B/COM.2/ISAR/CRP.3 by the UNCTAD secretariat available at www. UNCTAD.org. 
Villalonga, B., and Amit, R. (2006), “How do family ownership, control and management affect firm 
value?”, Journal of financial Economics, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 385-417. 
Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 40 No. 2, pp. 185-211. 
24 
 
Appendix. Full List of the UNCTAD ISAR Corporate Governance Disclosure Benchmark Provisions  
GINDEX 
Theme 
Disclosure Item Range 
of 
scores 
Total 
score per 
item 
(i) Ownership 
Structure and 
Exercise of 
Control 
Rights 
1. Ownership structure 0-1  
 
 
 
9 
2. Process for holding annual general meetings 0-1 
3. Changes in shareholdings 0-1 
4. Control structure 0-1 
5. Control and corresponding equity stake 0-1 
6. Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda 0-1 
7. Control rights 0-1 
8. Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in capital markets 0-1 
9. Anti-takeover measures 0-1 
(ii) Financial 
Transparency 
10. Financial and operating results 0-1  
 
 
8 
11. Critical accounting estimates 0-1 
12. Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions 0-1 
13. Company objectives 0-1 
14. Impact of alternative accounting decisions 0-1 
15. The decision-making process for approving transactions with related parties 0-1 
16. Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions 0-1 
17. Board's responsibilities regarding financial communications 0-1 
(iii) Auditing 18. Process for interaction with internal auditors 0-1  
 
 
 
9 
19. Process for interaction with external auditors 0-1 
20. Process for appointment of external auditors 0-1 
21. Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope of work and responsibilities 0-1 
22. Board confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors 0-1 
23. Internal control systems 0-1 
24. Duration of current auditors 0-1 
25. Rotation of audit partners 0-1 
26. Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the fees paid to the auditors 0-1 
(iv) Corporate 
Responsibility 
and 
Compliance 
27. Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility 0-1  
 
 
7 
28. Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the firm’s sustainability  0-1 
29. A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the ethics code 0-1 
30. A code of ethics for all company employees 0-1 
31. Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 0-1 
32. Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in business 0-1 
33. The role of employees in corporate governance 0-1 
 (v) Board and 
Management 
Structure and 
Process 
34. Governance structures, such as committees and other mechanisms to prevent conflict of 
interest 
0-1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
35. “Checks and balances” mechanisms 0-1 
36. Composition of board of directors (executives and non-executives) 0-1 
37. Composition and function of governance committee structures 0-1 
38. Role and functions of the board of directors 0-1 
39. Risk management objectives, system and activities 0-1 
40. Qualifications and biographical information on board members 0-1 
41. Material interests of members of the board and management 0-1 
42. Existence of plan of succession 0-1 
43. Duration of director's contracts 0-1 
44. Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm as a result of a merger or 
acquisition 
0-1 
45. Determination and composition of directors` remuneration 0-1 
46. Independence of the board of directors 0-1 
47. Number of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors 0-1 
48. Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest among board members 0-1 
49. Professional development and training activities 0-1 
50. Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period 0-1 
51. Performance evaluation process 0-1 
Total  51 GINDEX Items  51 
Scoring procedure 
0: If a particular corporate governance item is not disclosed. 
1: If a particular corporate governance item is disclosed. 
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Table 1. Sample selected   
Economic Sector/Country  Egypt Jordan Oman Saudi 
Arabia 
United Arab of 
Emirates 
Total 
Oil & Gas - - 2 2 2 6 
Basic Materials 4 4 3 2 - 13 
Industrials 4 6 6 4 5 25 
Consumer Goods 4 4 4 5 4 21 
Health Care 2 2 - - 2 6 
Consumer Services 2 2 4 4 4 16 
Telecommunications 2 1 1 3 3 10 
Technology 2 1 - - - 3 
Total 20 20 20 20 20 100 
 
Table2. Summary of variables and measures  
 
Dependent variables  
GINDEX Corporate governance (CG) Compliance and Disclosure Index containing 51 CG provisions using the CG 
benchmark of the United Nations Conference Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2006)'s guidance on good 
practice in CG disclosure, that takes 1 if each of the CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value 
between 0 and 100%.    
OSH Sub-index of GINDEX related to ownership structure and exercise of control rights consisting of 9 provisions 
that take a value of 1 if each of the 9 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 
100%.      
TCY Sub-index of GINDEX related to financial transparency consisting of 8 provisions that takes a value of 1 if 
each of the 8 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
AUD Sub-index of GINDEX related to auditing consisting of 9 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 9 
provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
RTY Sub-index of GINDEX related to corporate responsibility and compliance consisting of 7 provisions that takes 
a value of 1 if each of the 7 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
BMS Sub-index of GINDEX related to board and management structure and process consisting of 18 provisions that 
takes a value of 1 if each of the 18 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
Independent variables  
DIV 
 
DIVG 
DIVE 
UBL 
 
FSH 
DSH 
The percentage of the total number of women and ethnic minority (non-Arab) directors to the total number of 
board members. 
The percentage of women directors to the total number of board members. 
The percentage of ethnic minority (non-Arab) directors to the total number of board members. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of firm are combined at the 
end of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
Percentage of shares held by family members to the total number of shares issued.  
Percentage of shares held by directors to the total number of shares issued. 
GSH Percentage of shares held by government  to the total number of shares issued. 
Control variables 
BRDS 
AFSIZ 
 
LNTA 
Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of directors. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
Natural log of the book value of the total assets of a firm. 
AGE 
GRTH 
LV 
PROFIT 
Natural log of the total number of years since a company was established. 
The percentage of current year's sales minus previous year's sales divided by previous year's sales 
The percentage of total debt divided by total assets. 
Percentage of operating profit to total assets at the end of its financial year 
DYER Dummies for the years 2009 to 2014 inclusive. 
DIND 
 
DCOU 
Dummies for each of the eight main industries: basic materials; oil and gas; industrial; customer goods; 
customer services; health care; technology, and telecommunication. 
Dummies for each of the five countries 
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Table 3. Summary of descriptive statistics of the GINDEX, independent and control variables for all sampled firms  
  
      High – Low GINDEX 
Variables Mean Median STD Min Max Mean Diff. Median Diff. 
Panel A: The GINDEX based on all 600 MENA firm-years   
GINDEX% 56.45 56.86 11.59 31.37 84.31 -  -  
OSH% 63.31 66.67 11.77 22.22 100.00 - - 
TCY% 74.12 75.00 13.03 37.50 100.00 - - 
AUD% 53.70 55.56 22.24 0 100.00 - - 
RTY% 26.76 14.29 21.59 0 85.71 - - 
BMS% 58.09 61.11 15.58 22.22 88.89 - - 
Panel B: Firm-years with high GINDEX    
GINDEX% 65.50 64.71 6.35 56.86 84.31 - - 
OSH% 63.10 66.67 11.54 22.22 100.00 - - 
TCY% 79.59 87.50 10.58 50.00 100.00 - - 
AUD% 68.83 66.67 13.89 33.33 100.00 - - 
RTY% 37.39 28.57 22.46 0 85.71 - - 
BMS% 69.70 66.67 8.32 50.00 88.89 - - 
Panel C: Firm-years with low GINDEX   
GINDEX% 45.84 45.10 5.98 31.37 54.90 - - 
OSH% 63.57 66.67 12.05 22.22 77.78 - - 
TCY% 67.71 62.50 12.73 37.50 87.50 - - 
AUD% 35.95 33.33 16.27 0 77.78 - - 
RTY% 14.29 14.29 11.56 0 57.14 - - 
BMS% 44.46 44.44 10.11 22.22 66.67 - - 
Panel D: Independent variables   
DIV% 7.88 0 14.34 0 69.23 3.66*** 2.33** 
DIVG% 2.71 0 6.61 0 37.50 -1.45*** -1.78*** 
DIVE% 5.20 0 12.78 0 66.67 5.15*** 4.16*** 
UBL% 21.00 0 40.90 0 100.00 -40.00*** -36.90*** 
FSH% 49.85 47.06 28.39 1.08 100 4.61* 3.49 
DSH% 44.94 47.89 27.90 0 98.92 -1.96 -2.16 
GSH% 16.15 3.29 24.60 0 98.67 6.69*** 7.26*** 
Panel E: Control variables   
BRDS 
AFSIZ% 
LNTA ($m) 
8.52 
59.00 
2089.75 
9.00 
100.00 
184.45 
2.59 
49.30 
5728.52 
4.00 
0 
3.45 
19.00 
100.00 
35222.66 
-0.47** 
39.80*** 
3187.25*** 
-0.34 
38.70*** 
3350.94*** 
AGE 21.84 20.00 10.06 1.00 47.00 -2.68*** -1.98** 
GRTH % 9.06 6.01 45.46 -92.59 594.06 8.07** 8.89** 
LV% 20.38 17.99 17.65 0 69.75 3.76*** 4.55*** 
PROFIT % 6.56 6.11 7.76 -32.09 31.03 2.48*** 1.93*** 
 
Notes: GINDEX, MENA countries’ CG disclosure index; OSH, ownership structure and exercise of control rights; TCY, financial 
transparency; AUD, auditing; RTY, corporate responsibility and compliance; BMS, board and management structure and process; DIV, 
board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; DIVG, board diversity on the basis of gender; DIVE, board diversity on the basis 
of ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; DSH, director shareholdings; GSH, government shareholdings; 
BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNTA, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRTH, growth opportunity; LV, leverage; PROFIT, 
profitability. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively .  
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Table 4. Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables       
 
 GINDEX DIV DIVG DIVE UBL FSH DSH GSH BRDS AFSIZ LNTA AGE GRTH LV PRO FIT 
GINDEX 1 .034 -.178*** .245*** -.501*** -.059 -.137*** .166*** -.052 .420*** .464*** -.124*** .084** .144*** .119*** 
DIV .055 1 .612*** .753*** .039 -.273*** .308*** .016 .062 .163*** -.047 -.134*** -.021 .006 .186*** 
DIVG -.167*** .559*** 1 .027 .311*** -.158*** .169*** .167** .274*** .018 -.061 -.063 -.018 -.138*** .135*** 
DIVE .237*** .786*** .030 1 -.244*** -.243*** .236*** -.097** -0.074* .233*** .045 -.157*** -.016 .132*** .152*** 
UBL  -.500*** -.003 .279*** -.236*** 1 .091** .068* -.023 .249*** -.296*** -.196*** .067 .013 -.087** -.012 
FSH -.066 -.285*** -.151*** -.253*** .095** 1 -.607*** -.440*** -.060 -.315*** -.281*** .128*** -.048 -.011 -.205*** 
DSH -.155*** .323*** .152*** .262*** .072* -.597*** 1 .206*** .107*** .145*** .125*** -.143*** .105*** .078* .255*** 
GSH .140*** -.052 .077* -.123*** -0.027 -.470*** .273*** 1 .167*** .238*** .547*** .114*** .050 -.009 .137*** 
BRDS -.033 .054 .276*** -.119*** .243*** -.035 .093** .273*** 1 .150*** .355*** -.005 .099** .016 .077* 
AFSIZ .421*** .181*** .026 .235*** -.296*** -.299*** .154*** .350*** .135*** 1 .482*** -.088** .104** .225*** .174*** 
LNTA .454*** -.029 -.078* .059 -.204*** -.305*** .137*** .529*** .352*** .482*** 1 -.091** .156*** .298*** .066 
AGE -.172*** -.101** -.042 -.117*** .117*** .117*** -.082** .053 -0.030 -.123*** -.217*** 1 -.081** -.226*** -.077* 
GRTH .079* -.013 -.016 -.017 .012 -.074* .113*** .029 .094** .110*** .172*** -.121*** 1 .036 .290*** 
LV .141*** .028 -.137*** .144*** -.080** -.017 .063 -.053 .026 .212*** .329*** -.282*** .047 1 -.169*** 
PRO FIT .098** .177*** .120*** .148*** .001 -.197*** .233*** .046 .086** .158*** .053 -.030 .274*** -.209*** 1 
 
Notes: GINDEX, MENA countries’ CG disclosure index; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; DIVG, board diversity on the basis of gender; DIVE, board diversity on the basis of ethnicity; UBL, 
unitary of board leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; DSH, director shareholdings; GSH, government shareholdings; BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNTA, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRTH, growth opportunity; 
LV, leverage; PROFIT, profitability. The bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
The correlation matrix depicts the strength and sign of the relationship amongst the variables. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Determinants of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices (GINDEX) 
 
 Dependent Variable   
Ind. variables GINDEX  GINDEX  GINDEX  GINDEX   
(Model) 1  2  3  4  VIF 
DIV 0.095*** 
(0.001) 
 -  -  0.100*** 
(0.001) 
 1.56 
DIVG -  -  0.058 
(0.415) 
 -  - 
DIVE -  -  0.180*** 
(0.000) 
 -  - 
UBL -0.016* 
(0.087) 
 -  -0.016* 
(0.072) 
 -0.016* 
(0.071) 
 2.01 
FSH -  0.002 
(0.912) 
 0.018 
(0.203) 
 0.014 
(0.320) 
 2.39 
DSH -  -0.042*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.040*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.041*** 
(0.003) 
 2.21 
GSH -  -0.051*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.039** 
(0.033) 
 -0.042** 
(0.018) 
 2.16 
Control variables         
BRDS 0.014 
(0.204) 
 -  0.017 
(0.136) 
 0.015 
(0.202) 
 1.59 
AFSIZ  0.028*** 
(0.000) 
 -  0.027*** 
(0.000) 
 0.027*** 
(0.000) 
 1.62 
LNTA 0.005** 
(0.031) 
 0.015*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
 0.010*** 
(0.000) 
 4.93 
AGE -0.016*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.032) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.014** 
(0.013) 
 1.66 
GRTH -0.005 
(0.419) 
 -0.005 
(0.408) 
 -0.002 
(0.721) 
 -0.003 
(0.631) 
 1.26 
LV  0.018 
(0.351) 
 0.017 
(0.393) 
 0.006 
(0.749) 
 0.012 
(0.553) 
 1.79 
PROFIT   0.091** 
(0.026) 
 0.112*** 
(0.007) 
 0.099** 
(0.015) 
 0.102** 
(0.013) 
 1.46 
DYER  Included  Included  Included  Included  - 
DIND Included  Included  Included  Included  - 
DCOU  Included  Included  Included  Included  - 
Constant  0.533***  0.482***  0.506***  0.501***  - 
Durbin-Watson 2.097  2.081  2.129  2.086  - 
F-value 53.00***  53.37***  49.13***  49.56***  - 
Adjusted R
2 
Mean VIF 
68.46% 
3.02 
 67.73% 
3.08 
 69.97% 
3.04 
 69.42% 
3.05 
 - 
- 
No. of observations 600  600  600  600  - 
 
Notes: GINDEX, MENA countries’ CG disclosure index; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; 
DIVG, board diversity on the basis of gender; DIVE, board diversity on the basis of ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board 
leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; DSH, director shareholdings; GSH, government shareholdings; BRDS, board 
size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNTA, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRTH, growth opportunity; LV, leverage; PROFIT, 
profitability; DYER, year dummies; DIND, industry dummies; and DCOU, country dummies. *,**,***Significant at 10, 
5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Determinants of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices (Sub-indices) 
 
 Dependent variable s 
Ind. variables O SH   TCY  AUD  RTY  BMS 
(Model) 1  2  3  4  5 
DIV -0.024 
(0.589) 
 0.149*** 
(0.000) 
 0.137** 
(0.013) 
 0.400*** 
(0.000) 
 0.004 
(0.917) 
UBL 0.015 
(0.270) 
 -0.005 
(0.699) 
 -0.029* 
(0.084) 
 -0.011 
(0.606) 
 -0.033** 
(0.012) 
FSH -0.032 
(0.130) 
 0.020 
(0.296) 
 0.028 
(0.288) 
 0.014 
(0.674) 
 0.028 
(0.175) 
DSH -0.042** 
(0.043) 
 -0.012 
(0.538) 
 -0.053** 
(0.038) 
 -0.089*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.029 
(0.148) 
GSH -0.017* 
(0.478) 
 0.099*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.067** 
(0.020) 
 -0.115*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.054** 
(0.017) 
Control variables           
BRDS -0.043** 
(0.012) 
 0.035** 
(0.025) 
 0.053*** 
(0.010) 
 -0.101*** 
(0.000) 
 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
AFSIZ  -0.002 
(0.877) 
 0.044*** 
(0.000) 
 0.029** 
(0.021) 
 0.086*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009 
(0.353) 
LNTA 0.022*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.000) 
 0.011** 
(0.040) 
 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009** 
(0.019) 
AGE -0.014 
(0.112) 
 -0.016** 
(0.041) 
 -0.020* 
(0.065) 
 -0.000 
(0.985) 
 -0.017** 
(0.047) 
GRTH -0.002 
(0.822) 
 -0.001 
(0.907) 
 -0.013 
(0.274) 
 0.005 
(0.717) 
 0.003 
(0.752) 
LV  0.037 
(0.210) 
 0.082*** 
(0.002) 
 0.037 
(0.307) 
 -0.050 
(0.288) 
 0.021 
(0.463) 
PROFIT   0.074 
(0.227) 
 0.153*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.015 
(0.836) 
 0.201** 
(0.037) 
 0.113* 
(0.056) 
DYER  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DIND Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DCOU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  0.665***  0.936***  0.305***  0.292***  0.404*** 
Durbin-Watson 1.690  1.972  1.873  2.344  1.874 
F-value 11.68***  26.72***  56.95***  23.15***  39.81*** 
Adjusted R
2 
Mean VIF 
33.30% 
3.05 
 54.59% 
3.05 
 72.34% 
3.05 
 50.86% 
3.05 
 64.47% 
3.05 
No. of observations 600  600  600  600  600 
 
Notes: OSH, ownership structure and exercise of control rights; TCY, financial transparency; AUD, auditing; RTY, corporate 
responsibility and compliance; BMS, board and management structure and process; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both 
gender and ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; DSH, director shareholdings; GSH, 
government shareholdings; BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNTA, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRTH, growth 
opportunity; LV, leverage; PROFIT, profitability; DYER, year dummies; DIND, industry dummies; and DCOU, country 
dummies. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. Sensitivity analyses of the determinants of CG disclosures  
 
Ind. variables W-GINDEX  Non-linearity   Lagged-effects  2SLS  Fixed-effects  High-Size   Low-Size  
(Model) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
DIV 0.133*** 
(0.000) 
 0.100*** 
(0.001) 
 0.097*** 
(0.003) 
 0.353*** 
(0.000) 
 0.431*** 
(0.000) 
 0.168*** 
(0.000) 
 0.031 
(0.406) 
UBL -0.017** 
(0.048) 
 -0.017* 
(0.071) 
 -0.018* 
(0.051) 
 -0.051*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.025*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.044** 
(0.024) 
 0.000 
(0.971) 
FSH 0.011 
(0.414) 
 -  0.000 
(0.989) 
 0.209 
(0.203) 
 0.025 
(0.282) 
 -0.024* 
(0.070) 
 -0.015 
(0.129) 
FSH
2
 -  0.036*** 
(0.004) 
 -  -  -  -  - 
DSH -0.045*** 
(0.001) 
 - 
 
 -0.053*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.054* 
(0.098) 
 -0.015** 
(0.018) 
 -0.082*** 
(0.000) 
 0.028* 
(0.079) 
DSH
2
 -  -0.016 
(0.263) 
 -  -  -  -  - 
GSH -0.036** 
(0.044) 
 - 
 
 -0.033** 
(0.042) 
 -0.141*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.316** 
(0.047) 
 0.022 
(0.213) 
 -0.038 
(0.172) 
GSH
2
 -  -0.018 
(0.342) 
 -  -  -  -  - 
Control variables             
BRDS 0.001 
(0.944) 
 0.014 
(0.235) 
 0.015 
(0.209) 
 0.023 
(0.509) 
 0.011 
(0.351) 
 -0.021 
(0.211) 
 0.020 
(0.150) 
AFSIZ 0.033*** 
(0.000) 
 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
 0.026*** 
(0.000) 
 0.135*** 
(0.000) 
 0.012** 
(0.043) 
 0.100*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.024*** 
(0.000) 
LNTA 0.011*** 
(0.000) 
 0.010*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
 0.010*** 
(0.000) 
 0.007*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.007 
(0.192) 
 0.010** 
(0.015) 
AGE -0.013** 
(0.021) 
 -0.017*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.014** 
(0.024) 
 -0.014** 
(0.013) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.004 
(0.580) 
 -0.004 
(0.656) 
GRTH -0.003 
(0.673) 
 -0.004 
(0.525) 
 -0.000 
(0.949) 
 -0.003 
(0.631) 
 -0.002 
(0.632) 
 -0.007 
(0.424) 
 -0.004 
(0.581) 
LV  0.017 
(0.383) 
 0.007 
(0.733) 
 0.007 
(0.747) 
 0.012 
(0.553) 
 0.026 
(0.259) 
 0.056* 
(0.054) 
 0.010 
(0.646) 
PROFIT   0.105*** 
(0.010) 
 0.096** 
(0.018) 
 0.078* 
(0.078) 
 0.102** 
(0.013) 
 0.114*** 
(0.006) 
 0.190*** 
(0.003) 
 0.015 
(0.722) 
DYER Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DIND Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DCOU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  0.520***  0.421***  0.516***  0.111  0.631***  0.716***  0.436*** 
Durbin-Watson 2.152  2.065  2.186  2.086  1.481  1.924  2.083 
F-value 46.30***  49.07***  45.06***  49.56***  74.67***  30.30***  34.56*** 
Adjusted R
2 
Mean VIF 
67.92% 
3.05 
 69.20% 
3.03 
 70.45% 
3.00 
 69.42% 
3.42 
 93.45% 
- 
 73.29% 
2.55 
 75.19% 
2.35 
No. of ob. 600  600  600  600  600  300  300 
Notes: GINDEX, MENA countries’ CG disclosure index; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board leadership; FSH, 
family shareholdings; FSH
2
, family shareholdings squared; DSH, director shareholdings; DSH
2
, director shareholdings squared; GSH, government shareholdings; 
GSH
2
, government shareholdings squared; BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNTA, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRTH, growth opportunity; LV, leverage; 
PROFIT, profitability; DYER, year dummies; DIND, industry dummies; and DCOU, country dummies. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
